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Abstract
This article begins with a rather forceful defense of the explanatory role 
of formal institutions—and, in particular, constitutions—in the study of 
democratization. Important aspects of constitutions play a significant part 
in shaping the quality, type, and survival of institutional arrangements in new 
democracies. With this assumption, the article turns seriously to theories of 
constitutional design, any of which must grapple with the overwhelming prima 
facie evidence of constitutional diffusion. It is well known that constitutional 
ideas travel easily across contexts. However, scholars until now have lacked 
even basic empirical evidence regarding the patterns of constitutional 
similarity across time and space. This article introduces exactly this sort of 
evidence in the context of 19th-century Europe, employing a new data set 
expressly designed for such a purpose. The analysis uncovers a number of 
new insights regarding the spread of constitutional ideas in Europe, insights 
that disturb some of the classic narratives of democratization in these cases.
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“History . . . is far too important a topic to be just left to historians” (p. 347), 
noted Dankwart Rustow in his seminal 1970 article on the process of democ-
ratization. Rustow’s article, in turn, helped to transform at least two generations 
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of political scientists into avid historians bent—almost relentlessly—on pur-
suing the sources of regime change. Now, researchers are returning to deeper 
reaches of history to reevaluate the seemingly settled ideas regarding the 
democratization in 19th-century Europe. The conventional wisdom regarding 
these cases stems in large part from a set of canonical works (notably Luebbert, 
1991; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992) that point to 
the explanatory power of a variation in class arrangements. Nevertheless, the 
very idea of democratic waves implies another important set of causal factors: 
that the decisions of actors in one jurisdiction affect decisions in another, a set 
of processes that sometimes goes under the label of diffusion. A renewed 
focus on these more international factors—which have always been at least a 
background consideration for democratization scholars—is one of the hall-
marks of recent research on the subject (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010). Using 
various analytic tools, democratization scholars have struggled to diagnose 
these interdependent processes in second- and third-wave cases (e.g., R. B. 
Collier, 1993; Coppedge & Brinks, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). The 
objective of this article is to explore the possibility of diffusion in cases of 
institutional reform in 19th-century Europe. My particular focus is on the pat-
terns of change in written constitutions, the quintessential, if sometimes overly 
formal, manifestation of a country’s democratic political institutions.
This analytic and substantive turn toward constitutions does not come 
without apparent costs, and there we begin. The view espoused herein is that 
the benefits of reading democratization through the lens of constitutional 
reform far outweigh any costs. Indeed, the analysis of the content of constitu-
tions communicates an enormous amount of information about the process, 
nature, and probability of democratic reform. These benefits accrue despite 
the skepticism of some about the efficacy of constitutions in young democra-
cies. In turn, if constitutional choices have consequences for democracy, then 
it follows that diffusion—which we strongly suspect, uncontroversially, of 
shaping constitutional design—is also part of the democratization story. On 
this point, the literature on the transfer of institutions in Europe lacks answers 
to some of the most basic empirical questions, a gap I endeavor to fill with a 
focus on early-19th-century developments. Which of the world’s constitu-
tions were most central to European drafters? Along which networks of influ-
ence did constitutional ideas flow? In a macro analysis of the elements of 
European constitutions, the analysis below demonstrates some less obvious 
but still undeniably consequential effects of diffusion in the European con-
text. These effects are all the more apparent once we drill down to several 
episodes of constitution making, an approach advocated by Capoccia and 
Ziblatt (2010). Thus, in a process-oriented analysis, I examine the initial 
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sequence of constitutional decisions in Spain and Portugal at the beginning 
of the 19th century. These constitutions, as it happens, represent extremely 
important decisions (for both Iberian and non-Iberian successors alike), and 
the role of diffusion in at least the Iberian cases seems to have had far-reach-
ing effects on democracy.
More broadly, the analysis below has real implications for the scholarly 
agenda. Specifically, all told, the evidence suggests reasons to be sanguine 
about the return of democracy scholars to the “cold cases” from 19th-century 
Europe. Certainly, there is still much yet to be wrung from these important 
cases, and by no means should we consider them closed.
Written Constitutions and Democratization
That constitutions should have something to do with the development and 
performance of democracy is not at all obvious. Indeed, one could be excused 
for thinking the opposite. It is not unusual to read the following observation 
about higher law in new democracies, in this case contemporary Africa:
Although every African country has a constitution as well as a body of 
laws and administrative procedures that place formal limits on execu-
tive power, the long-held consensus among observers is that these rules 
play very little role in actually constraining leaders’ behavior. (Posner 
& Young, 2007, p. 127)
One could easily substitute “19th-century European” for “African” in Posner 
and Young’s (2007) sentence without much dispute from historians. But, of 
course, it should be of no surprise to observe that constitutions matter in some 
places and at some times and not everywhere and not always. Indeed, a prof-
itable research program would be one dedicated to understanding the condi-
tional impact of constitutions better. But what, if anything, can the study of 
nonconstitutionalist constitutions tell us about democratic reform?1
One answer is that intentions matter. One wants to know why drafters—
who often believe, if delusionally, that they are constructing the foundation of 
a democratic state—decide on one constitutional provision rather than another. 
This curiosity would persist even, perhaps especially, in cases in which con-
stitutions do not constrain government (as in, why do such constitutions not 
“work”?). In this sense, constitutional drafters have deposited a very useful set 
of historical records of episodes of intentional institutional reform, whether or 
not the drafters’ reform is ever realized. Indeed, that claim may even put things 
too mildly. Compared to the historical material that scholars usually consult to 
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document the democratization “process” of democratic transitions, the deci-
sions and deliberations of constitutional drafters provide a degree of precision, 
concreteness, and yes relevance that is unmatched.
Exploring Some Assumptions About 
Constitutions and Democracy
These claims may still strike those derisive of constitutions as empty rhet-
oric. It seems useful, therefore, to establish some empirical moorings before 
proceeding further. To begin, consider three empirical regularities concern-
ing the history of constitutions and democracy, regularities that provide a 
better historical sense of the nexus of these two concepts.
First, constitutions may not always lead to democracy, but it is nearly 
unthinkable—or at least nearly unprecedented in the modern era—that a state 
would achieve democracy without a constitution. Except for Great Britain, no 
state since 1800 has achieved a score of full democracy (on any of the histori-
cal indices such as Polity) without adopting a written constitution. I introduce 
this coincidence not to state a necessary condition for democracy but rather to 
note simply that democratization and constitution writing have developed 
concurrently and are part of the normative script for the respectable modern 
state. One implication of this observation, then, is the reminder that written 
constitutions are indeed likely to serve as a useful record of at least the public 
and institutional designs of democrats. The record offers distinct analytic 
benefits. In contrast to the highly abstract, aggregate, and often wide-ranging 
historical material used to build stories of transition to democracy, constitu-
tions make for a very tractable and discrete unit of analysis. To take only one 
case, consider Mexico, which progressed gradually toward democracy over a 
70-year period but to which scholars typically pin a transition date of 2000 
(or sometimes 1994; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, 1996). 
Studying and documenting the decision process of the protracted Mexican 
transition as an event presents serious challenges for those who would insist 
we look beyond the 2000 and 1994 elections. By contrast, the almost yearly 
reforms to the 1917 constitution—and their accompanying debate—mark the 
evolutionary changes in democratic institutions in an illuminating and con-
crete way.
A second empirical regularity is that constitutions are nearly universal 
among states after 1800 but democracy is not, which is to say that ruling 
authoritarians are as likely to have a constitution in force (at least formally) 
as are ruling democrats. In small part, this lack of correspondence between 
constitutions and democracy is explained by a certain flexibility of the con-
stitutional form. Even autocrats like to write down the organizational form of 
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government (witness Singapore), even if they are not always inclined to 
include elections, rights, and independent commissions. However, these sorts 
of illiberal constitutions are exceedingly rare. The overwhelming majority of 
constitutions written by authoritarians formally espouse democratic princi-
ples and provide for democratic institutions. For example, of the historical 
constitutions written during authoritarian settings (defined by a Polity score 
of less than 6), 82% include provisions for the right to free speech as opposed 
to 88% of constitutions written in democratic settings. We can say the same 
for other traditional civil rights such as right to assembly (76% vs. 89%), 
freedom of the press (51% vs. 57%), and even provisions to elect members 
of the legislature (25% vs. 34%), which are uncommon in any constitution but 
not much more uncommon in “authoritarian” constitutions (Comparative Con-
stitutions Project). These numbers do not suggest striking differences in con-
tent between authoritarian and democratic products. Therefore, most of the gap 
between the near universality of constitutional regimes and the more exclusive 
set of democratic regimes is explained by the phenomenon of authoritarians 
governing with a loosely or selectively enforced democratic constitution.
One can rattle off one’s favorite cases of authoritarian regimes with resplen-
dently democratic constitutions. Often, the poster children for this cause are 
regimes of the authoritarian Left, whether it be the Soviet Union or the various 
and nearly extinct republics with “People” in their name. In the constitutions 
of many of these states, modes of democratic participation are many and var-
ied, all manner of rights are in evidence, and the citizens are championed as 
sovereign. Those of the authoritarian Right are equally likely, in their own 
way, to write democratic institutions into their constitutions, often with the 
same allegations of hypocrisy from critics. The adherence to democracy in 
formal constitutions speaks, perhaps, to the power of democracy as an inter-
national norm, or at least to universal aspirations among drafters for democ-
racy at some point in the future. Either way, the point is that constitutions are 
almost exclusively democratic in form, regardless of their application.
The universality of the democratic form in constitutional design, if not 
practice, may actually explain, in part, a third empirical regularity: the sur-
prisingly loose connection between regime change and constitutional change. 
It seems reasonable to expect that regime change and constitutional change 
would go hand in hand. Not so. Roughly 19% and 27% of transitions to 
democracy and authoritarianism, respectively, coincide with constitutional 
change (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2009).2 New authoritarians may be 
slightly more likely to write constitutions than are new democrats following 
a transition, but that represents a small difference: The broader point is that 
neither is automatically inclined to do so, at least immediately. One explanation 
for this disjuncture may lie in the interest of actors to preserve constitutional 
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stability or accommodate elements of the ancien régime (e.g., Chile follow-
ing the departure of Pinochet). Another may be, simply, that leaders within 
both regimes are accustomed to live with and write democratic constitutions 
and so they can as often as not share a constitutional document. In this sense, 
the democrat’s response may be to step up enforcement of the document 
(“Finally!” he might say); the authoritarian’s response may be to ignore at 
least parts of it (“Constitution? What constitution?”). In any case, the moder-
ate connection between constitutional replacement and regime change sug-
gests that (a) new constitutions will not always coincide with democratic 
milestones, and vice versa, and (b) students of democratization may need to 
pay attention to allegedly “authoritarian” constitutions as well as “demo-
cratic” ones since marking them as such may not make sense.
To be sure, we should be wary of placing too much stock in the parchment 
promises of authoritarians. Nevertheless, there are at least two more reasons 
why we should temper our derision toward even these constitutions. For one 
thing, as a number of scholars have shown, the presence of some democratic 
institutions—however enforced—in an authoritarian setting is significantly 
better (i.e., more democratic) than none (Lindberg, 2006; Przeworski, 2010). 
Second, as I noted above, constitutions are famously aspirational, and there 
is reason to believe that democratic seeds need time to take root. One does 
not have to look far to find cases of aspirational constitutions whose succeed-
ing generations have fulfilled even its most fantastic promises. For example, 
it took at least a generation to realize the provisions of the Mexican constitu-
tion of 1917, one of the more progressive documents of this century. In retro-
spect, the parchment promises of 1917 have been formative. All this to say 
that even the seemingly hypocritical constitutions of the authoritarian can 
bear some democratic fruit later.
Together, these three empirical regularities amount to an important under-
standing about constitutions. Writing constitutions—in whatever setting—is 
largely a process of forming and designing democratic institutions, not author-
itarian ones. Outcomes (i.e., de facto constitutional practice) may vary widely, 
but de jure constitutional design is decidedly democratic, and scholars of 
democracy should take note, to say the least.
Theoretical Foundations of the Nexus 
of Constitutions and Democracy
Why are constitutions intrinsic to democracy? The history of ideas suggests 
a simple answer. Constitutions are the written manifestation of the social 
contract, a concept central to the mind-set of democratic founders in 
the 19th century and beyond. As evidence of the wide applicability of the 
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concept, consider that the prescriptions of contractarian theorists span vari-
ous democratic forms, from the constitutional monarchy espoused by Hobbes 
to the liberal democracy promoted by Locke and Rousseau. It is hardly too 
literal to suggest that the logical expression of the exchange of citizen con-
sent for limits on the sovereign is a written constitutional contract. One can 
argue, of course, that limited government (contractarianism) is not equiva-
lent to democracy. For example, the sovereign can agree not to trample on 
the basic freedoms of conscience, association, expression, and property and 
still deprive citizens of representative, much less direct, government. At the 
minimum, however, assuming that a contract does not simply displace 
power, its imposition of limits on the sovereign (of population N) will nearly 
always have the effect of sharing power (if only a small amount) with a 
larger group numbering N + 1, and thus shift regimes in a direction away 
from autocracy.
However, even if one agrees that constitutions are inherently democratiz-
ing, one might argue that the written contract remains, effectively, a philo-
sophical abstraction because even in the presence of a physical text, citizens 
lack any mechanism of enforcement. Parchment barriers may remain just 
that, parchment. After all, who is to punish the sovereign when he or she 
sends the military to close a meeting of unionists? The unionists? The citi-
zenry at large? The aged magistrates assigned to identify breaches to the 
social contract, assuming that they could even agree on such?
No. Constitutions may be written like contracts, but they operate more like 
coordinating mechanisms. This point accords with important contributions to 
the study of constitutional enforcement (e.g., Ordeshook, 1992; Przeworski, 
1991; Weingast, 1997). Weingast’s (1997) model is particularly instructive 
here. In his scenario, the only way to ensure that the sovereign abides by the 
social contract is for citizens to challenge his or her transgressions collec-
tively. Partial challenges will be steamrolled by the sovereign, and therefore 
citizens will not challenge his or her transgression unless they expect support 
from their fellow citizens. Critical to expecting reinforcement is a unified 
understanding of, and respect for, the limits of the social contract. Only then 
can citizens coordinate to challenge the sovereign. Some constitutions lead to 
a unified understanding of, and respect for, their limits better than others. 
Elsewhere, I (with my coauthors) have suggested that clarity of interpretation 
is enhanced by specific (not framework) documents that provide for interpre-
tation by a respected arbiter and that widespread attachment to the document 
is generated by participatory adoption processes and reinforced by constitu-
tional longevity (Elkins et al., 2009). In complementary fashion, reasonably 
low-cost amendment rules and the presence of a mechanism for interpre-
tive changes encourage the sovereign to avoid transgression by adapting the 
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constitution, thus prolonging it and reinforcing clarity and attachment. These 
particular hypotheses may be disputed, but most of us would agree with the 
larger point: that some constitutions—based on their content and process of 
adoption—may be better than others in coordinating citizen challenges to sov-
ereign transgression. Ideally, the result of this coordination is the equilibrium 
that we often celebrate as consolidated democracy. In that scenario, the sover-
eign expects united opposition to his or her transgression and declines to 
transgress in the first place. Thus, the important quality of self-enforcement.
The important implication of this line of reasoning is that the content of 
constitutions has profound effects on the stability and quality of democracy 
in a given polity. These consequences follow both from the varying ability of 
constitutions to coordinate citizens and constrain the sovereign (i.e., attri-
butes like those I suggest above) and, perhaps more obviously, from the par-
ticular mix of institutional choices that framers make. This last point, I would 
guess, is less controversial than the first, even if there continues to be some 
dispute between institutionalists (e.g., Duverger, 1954) and those privileging 
social structure (e.g., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967)—to take two classic stances—
about the relative weight of institutions and social cleavages in determining 
democratic outcomes. Surely, however, no one would deny that differences 
in the choice of executive–legislative arrangements (e.g., presidentialism vs. 
parliamentarism), electoral systems, and the provision of rights has no effect 
on the kind of democracy that citizens experience. Indeed, a poll of contem-
porary political scientists might suggest quite the opposite.
In summary, constitutions have unique analytic benefits for the student of 
democratic reform. They record, at the very least, the intentions of demo-
cratic reformers. Moreover, they serve a critical function in democracies: 
coordinating citizen defense of the limits on the sovereign. Importantly, some 
constitutions will foster coordination better than others, and undoubtedly, 
some constitutional provisions will alter the character and quality of demo-
cratic governance. To the degree that we can account for these differences in 
content, we can presumably say a great deal about paths of democracy.
Diffusion, Critical Junctures, 
and Constitutional Design
If one is at all inclined to grant a role for constitutions in shaping democratic 
institutions, then one must develop a theory of constitutional design. One 
view of such design may be that constitutions are purely epiphenomenal 
in that they are nothing but a reflection of domestic political forces and 
traditions—the “real” source of political change. In this view, constitutions 
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merely enshrine the norms and customs already in place. If one were to push 
this line to the extreme, one might argue that the French document of 1791 
merely enshrined the accepted rights and privileges of French citizens and 
clarified the rules by which Louis XVI would exercise authority. Of course, 
nobody—from the nobility to the church to the royals to the third estate—
would view the document in such terms. Nor is the French charter of 1791—as 
revolutionary as it was—exceptional in this sense. Indeed, as I noted above, 
constitutional designers are more likely to fantasize about what political soci-
ety could be than they are to record what it is. In this sense, an assumption of 
epiphenomenal constitutions would not disturb in the slightest most “classic” 
accounts of European democratization (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010). Whatever 
the effect on democracy of class structure, cultural predisposition, and the 
level of economic development, these variables would be baked into the con-
stitutional design. In that view, the constitution would only reinforce a 
country’s historical trajectory and predisposition toward democracy, not exer-
cise any independent effect on it.
By contrast, an assumption of exogenous constitutional design profoundly 
disturbs these classic explanations. If a constitutional design transcends the 
basic contours of a particular political and historical environment, then we 
must look at the factors that predict that design. Without the space to con-
struct a full theoretical model of constitutional design, it seems reasonable 
enough to assert that diffusion—by some mechanism or another—plays a 
large role.
Constitutions burst on the international scene at the turn of the 18th cen-
tury. In 1786, no independent country had a legal document that it called its 
“constitution”; by 1875 all but a handful of countries had such a document. In 
some cases, this rapid change in the documentation of fundamental institu-
tions was merely nominal. In the preconstitutional era, other documents such 
as the Magna Carta or the treaty-like Articles of Confederation of the United 
States had performed functions similar to modern constitutions. Even nominal 
changes can be consequential, however, and for many states the writing of a 
new constitution ushered in a marked shift in their institutional landscape. In 
a global sense, moreover, the widespread adoption of this new legal instru-
ment set for the first time an international standard for how countries should 
proclaim their sovereignty and contract among their contending political, 
social, and economic groups. By mid-19th century, the founding charter was 
as much a part of the required script for independent states as was a flag, a 
national anthem, and a motto. This shift in legal convention has analytic 
implications. The timing of the emergence of modern constitution means that 
the texts that I analyze below are decidedly 18th- and 19th-century products, 
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not preserved documents from an earlier era. This point matters given that our 
intention is to understand shifts in 19th- and early-20th-century thinking.
Even a cursory understanding of constitutional history leads one to suspect 
that some degree of transfer of ideas, if not outright plagiarism, was at work 
in the drafting of these charters. As one might expect from the sudden and 
pervasive emergence of constitutions after 1787, the resulting texts bore strik-
ing similarities. Legend has it that some constitutions in the 1800s shared not 
only the same provisions but also the same typographical errors. How is it that 
the most fundamental governing laws of states—documents that often sym-
bolize the independence and sovereignty of such countries—could be mere 
reproductions? Elsewhere I have theorized (Elkins, 2009) about the various 
inducements and constraints that lead constitution makers to entertain foreign 
models, but those specific mechanisms are largely unimportant to our mission 
here. Suffice it to say that a collection of drafters pressed to build the founda-
tions of government in a short period of time and with multiple and conflicting 
imperatives does not shy from reviewing the examples of other countries. 
The idea of constitutional borrowing violently collides with the assumption of 
unit independence that Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010) rightfully question in 
the context of European democratization. If constitutions are, at least in 
part, imported, and if constitutions structure the performance and nature of 
democracy, then we will be ignoring an important—and interesting—factor 
explaining democratic reform by treating constitutional design experiences as 
independent.
But this acknowledgment of interdependence leads to another assumption 
that democratization scholars have begun to question: that of unit homogene-
ity. Just as the effects of domestic variables—whether they be structural, con-
tingent, or cultural—are likely to have conditional effects, so too will factors 
such as diffusion. Neighborhood effects, for example, may not work the same 
way in one region as they would in another region. Europe, for reasons that 
I detail below, had a much more complicated set of constitutional influences 
than did Latin America (the other region undergoing rapid constitutionaliza-
tion at the time), and thus we should see a more complicated regional pattern 
in Europe.
Any theory of constitutional design must also grapple with the fact that 
design is episodic. The asynchronic nature of constitutional development 
implies that we should think of constitutional—and, thus, democratic—
change as one characterized by periods of stability interrupted by short sharp 
moments of change. In short, a process of punctuated equilibrium, to use the 
evolutionary catch phrase. Most of this has to do with the high costs of for-
mal constitutional change. Certainly, incremental constitutional adjustment 
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is possible by informal means—for example, as norms develop or leading 
actors vary the accepted interpretation of the text. However, formal change of 
entrenched higher law requires widespread consent, sufficient motivation, 
and a fair amount of societal coordination. Constitutions, after all, are 
intended to last with only a modicum of periodic formal adjustment. As such, 
constitutional commitments, by design, entail significant costs to undo. Wit-
ness the difficulty of assembling the various delegates to Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787 and the resistance to their replacing (not amending) the Arti-
cles of Confederation. These assemblies of “demigods” (Jefferson)3 are not 
likely to happen often.
The historical implication is that constitutional (and democratic) develop-
ment will be fitful, and the analytic implication is that one should study epi-
sodes rather than characterize periods. Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010) make this 
recommendation with respect to democratization more generally. In the case 
of constitutional history, their advice is particularly germane. Fortunately, 
constitutional design tends to be a fairly public endeavor, and their episodes 
should not be shrouded in mystery. Historians and the media alike are under 
the impression—corroborated, I hope, by my soundings here—that moments 
of constitutional design matter. With their documentation, we generally can 
reconstruct some semblance of the decision-making process, the basic con-
tours of the debate during the deliberative moments, the various participants 
and their constituencies, how their product was received by the larger public, 
and of course how the document was treated and mistreated in subsequent 
years. What results is, comparatively speaking, a fairly illuminating picture 
of a critical moment in the development of political institutions (Capoccia & 
Kelemen, 2007).
The Constitutionalization of Europe
Analytic Design
If this theory makes at least intuitive sense, then our empirical marching 
orders are fairly clear. For one, we must trace the DNA of constitutions. This 
means understanding the degree to which, if at all, constitutions owe an intel-
lectual debt to prior domestic constitutions and prior foreign constitutions. We 
do not have a clear sense of these lineages or the mechanisms that sired them. 
At the most basic level, we have very little systematic knowledge of patterns 
of similarity among the various documents. It is quite common for scholars, in 
discussing particular constitutions, to point out the various influences on, and 
intellectual antecedents of, the documents. But how much influence? Are 
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those influences manifest when one looks at the content systematically and 
compares the shared content across an entire set of constitutions?
In tracing the roots of national constitutions, I tap an original data resource 
expressly created for uncovering patterns of constitutional diffusion. That 
resource, the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins & Ginsburg, 2010), 
records a large set of characteristics of constitutions for nearly every inde-
pendent state since 1789. The sample currently includes all constitutions in 
force since 1945 and roughly 60% of those suspended or replaced before 
then. Figure 1 more clearly describes both the sample and the universe of 
cases. More information on the sample, the measurement of central concepts, 
and coding procedures are available online at the project’s Web site.4
A second analytic responsibility is to revisit—selectively—particular con-
stitutional moments to understand more concretely, and in more illuminating 
fashion, the process that generated these contracts. Accordingly I focus on the 
first constitutions of Spain and Portugal, two cases that provide distinct ana-
lytic advantages. In many ways, these are countries that faced very similar 
constitutional problems. However, their constitutional assemblies were mark-
edly different in terms of their setting and the identity of the participants. 
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Nevertheless, the resulting Portuguese constitution followed the earlier Span-
ish document quite closely. These choices would prove to have lasting effects 
on the constitutional evolution of Spain and Portugal and, by association, the 
evolution of politics in countries inspired by the Iberian constitutions.
The Rise of Contracting
The constitutionalization of European states following the promulgation of 
the U.S. document in 1789 was rapid and thorough. In the space of 50 years 
following the Philadelphia convention, constitutions had become a thor-
oughly necessary trapping in the script of European statehood. Figure 1 
provides a sense of the rapid adoption of written constitutions after 1789. In 
fact, only two states in Europe that existed prior to 1789 adopted constitu-
tions later than 1850, and both of these (Monaco in 1911 and Andorra in 
1993) are city-states and understandably atypical.
In some ways, the rapid constitutionalization of Europe is surprising. For 
states founded after 1789, the need for a constitution would seem obvious. 
Such states are under especially strong pressures to proclaim and legitimize 
their sovereignty. But for European states that had functioned well enough 
without a constitution for years, to follow fashion and write such a contract 
might have seemed unnecessary, if not slavish. Of course, seismic interrup-
tions in the politics of these states (e.g., a loss of sovereignty to a foreign 
invading power, a social revolution, or a coup) would in some ways create 
opportunities and challenges that are analogous to those facing new states. 
Certainly, we do see slower constitution adoption rates in Europe than in the 
new states in Latin America, but the differences are not enormous; the early 
19th century was a period of constitutionalization for any independent state, 
Latin American or European.
Sources of External Inspiration
But which constitutional models would attract European drafters? The U.S. 
model, which understandably shaped much of Latin American constitutional 
thought, was certainly one plausible option. But Europe was further from the 
United States and, undoubtedly, used to sending its ideas to the Americas, not 
the reverse. A reasonable and widely held diffusion assumption is that the 
spread of practices across hierarchical “classes” of countries (whether opera-
tionalized in terms of resources, status, or experience) operates in a top-down 
direction, but not bottom-up. More generally, the transmission of policies 
across vertical as opposed to horizontal networks is a common theme in the 
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diffusion literature, and some scholars have sought to assess the strength of 
vertical as opposed to horizontal processes (e.g., D. Collier & Messick, 
1975). Regardless of the strength of these influences, a basic assumption is 
that those jurisdictions at the top are not particularly influenced by the expe-
riences of those lower down the hierarchy. Thus, the position of European 
states of the 19th century—many of which were then endowed with not only 
a long political tradition but also a sizable share of resources and interna-
tional status—left these states with a more limited set of relevant models. 
Their elevated position in the international network suggests that, to the 
extent they are subject to network influences, they would be attuned mostly 
to the experience of their peers in the region.
Thus, European constitutions in the early 19th century should not be 
expected to be recycle or even adapt the U.S. document. Among the Euro-
pean set, however, no single model recommended itself as a replacement, at 
least at the turn of the century. France, the European birthplace of constitu-
tionalism, would seem, in some ways, to have been a logical source of con-
stitutional inspiration, and indeed it was. However, the rather tumultuous 
constitutional beginning in France—with four constitutions in the first decade 
of the revolution—did not present an obvious French alternative. Or, more 
precisely, France presented four alternatives, each of which was inspirational 
in its own way (albeit not always voluntarily so in the case of its third and 
fourth constitutions, which Napoleon bestowed on his conquered fiefdoms).
Indeed, a brief accounting of the events and content of this series of French 
constitutions does much to capture, if not explain, some of the diversity in 
future European constitutions. The 1791 constitution is, of course, the French 
charter most celebrated. It was the first and, as such, cleared much of the brush 
of the ancien régime. It cleared the brush only partly, of course, as the 1791 
document left the monarchy intact, although limited. Still, the document legal-
ized the revolution and broke new intellectual ground by formally incorporat-
ing the Declaration of Rights, some of which (such as the right to education 
and other aspects of égalité) went beyond the civil and political rights that 
were added in that same year to the U.S. Constitution. Not only that, but as an 
arrangement that accommodated a limited monarchy, the 1791 document 
would be attractive to future European states with a monarchical presence of 
their own. Nevertheless, the French revolution would progress, as we know, in 
an increasingly violent manner and the 1791 document was in effect for only a 
year. In 1793, it was replaced by a Jacobin-drafted document that removed the 
king and moved the country further toward a republic. The 1793 constitution—
a document a quarter the size of the other three early French constitutions of 
the decade—would never go into effect. This despite a remarkable outcome 
in what may have been the first ever popular referendum on a modern 
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constitution, in which the public approved the document by a margin of 1.8 
million to 11,000. (One wonders at the brave 1% that voted against the Reign 
of Terror.) In any event, constitutional limits did not suit the Terror very well, 
and the Jacobins dealt with crisis by ruling by decree, not with their constitu-
tion. As for the future effect of the 1793 document, Hawgood’s (1939) descrip-
tion is apt: “Alone, the Jacobin constitution of 1793 had to wait over half a 
century before providing acknowledged inspiration, and then it was in France 
herself [the 1848 constitution]. The world was too busy trying to forget the 
Jacobins and all their work” (p. 43). Nonetheless, the 1793 document and its 
republican ideals would ultimately have their intellectual heirs, albeit by skip-
ping a generation or two. The 1795 constitution, which was enacted more 
to dispel the Terror than to further revolutionary ideals, would have a much 
more immediate impact on the rest of Europe. That constitution may have back-
tracked on some democratic principles—Plato, as the constitutional debates 
noted, would not have held political rights in the new order (Hawgood, 1939)—
but it was clearly a solidly republican document. Gone was the monarchy, but in 
other ways the 1795 text was similar to the 1791 text. One significant difference 
between the two was the addition in 1795 of a second chamber and the inclusion 
of duties as well as rights, a feature that is most noticeable when one compares 
future European constitutions with an eye toward identifying their French roots. 
By 1795, France had taken a more imperial stance toward its neighbors, and 
French satellites passed over the earlier two French constitutional models and 
adopted the latest French product. Again, the colorful Hawgood (1939), “The 
Paris fashion when the countries on her borders began, either under her direct 
domination or under her spell, to remodel their institutions on French lines, was 
not the democratic constitution of 1793, but the compromise constitution of 
1795” (p. 40). Nevertheless, the 1795 document would itself become outmoded 
with Napoleon’s coup d’état in November 1799 and the rapid drafting of a new 
document a month later. Fifteen years of Napoleonic rule abroad meant that the 
1799 constitution found itself replicated elsewhere. In Spain, for example, 
Napoleon’s brother Joseph assumed the throne in 1808, accompanied by a new 
constitution modeled after the French one of 1799.
Spain, indeed, demonstrates quite well the diversity in European constitu-
tions attributable to the various French sources. In 1812, following the short 
and unhappy life of the Napolean-influenced 1808 constitution, the Spanish 
Cortes drafted a much admired document that drew on the French text of 
1791 and offered a useful update to the first French text for other states 
emerging from a Bonapartist intervention or interested in a constitutional 
monarchy. As I describe below, the Portuguese text of 1822 and the very 
important (and also allegedly widely imitated) Belgian constitution of 1831 
were direct descendants of the Spanish constitution of 1812. We can thus 
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trace the inheritance of various European constitutional traditions to different 
sources just within France, a diverse genetic pool that would seem to predict 
a fair amount of heterogeneity in early European constitutions.
By contrast, the upstart Latin American states found themselves not only 
without a significant institutional history of their own but also with a more 
obvious set of models. First, the innovations of the U.S. founders (as fellow 
young states) are likely to have been more influential in Latin America than 
they would be across the Atlantic. Any connection between the United States 
and Latin American states because of geography and generation, of course, 
was only intensified by their shared experience in emerging from underneath 
a colonial power. It seems likely that the burgeoning Latin American states 
were influenced by the constitutional models from Europe as well, if a more 
limited set of them. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that despite what 
seem, in retrospect, like obvious reasons for U.S.–Latin America confluence 
(because of geography and shared revolutionary experience), the transmission 
of ideas, goods, and visitors within the Americas paled in comparison to the 
transmission of these things between the Americas and Europe. Add to that the 
elevated status of the European states and a more familiar language and cul-
ture, and the allure of European constitutions would seem at least equal to that 
of the United States. Given the timing of the emergence of Latin American 
states, the Spanish constitution of 1812 made for an obvious model, and one 
whose language and institutional legacy led to relatively painless adaptation.
Macro Analysis of Constitutional Similarity Patterns
We can explore these expectations and describe the temporal and spatial 
differences with data from the Comparative Constitutions Project on the 
content of constitutions since 1789. The basic approach is to construct a mea-
sure of the similarity in content between any two constitutions at their birth. 
Several considerations arise in building such a measure. The first involves the 
ingredients of the measure. Our data record almost 600 characteristics of 
constitutions, and so we are faced with the delicate task of selecting the attri-
butes with which to construct the measure. Furthermore, although we can 
compare whether two constitutions make the same choices on any given list 
of provisions, we can also compare more simply whether two constitutions 
address the same issues. Both alternatives have their advantages, and in this 
analysis we consider one of each type.
The first measure, call it a measure of inventory similarity (IS), considers 
the array of topics included in any two constitutions. Such a measure is com-
posed of a series of binary variables indicating whether topic x or y is covered 
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in the constitution (e.g., Does the constitution specify the method of selection 
for the head of government, mention a central bank, address the accession of 
new territory, etc.?). I have identified 70 topics along which I calculate such 
a measure. I exclude from this list many subtopic items that should be under-
stood as making rather refined distinctions between constitutions. The goal is 
to identify topics at a general level and thus measure broad areas of inclusion 
or exclusion in constitutions. I exclude topics that are either highly prevalent 
or highly rare (appearing in more than 95% or less than 5% of all constitu-
tions, respectively) because items with low variance will dilute the power of 
other items to differentiate constitutional inventories.
The second measure digs more deeply and considers choices within these 
topics and focuses, in particular, on provisions with respect to rights. One could 
build a more expansive measure of content similarity that includes items hav-
ing to do with a wider range of institutional choices. However, a measure of the 
similarity of institutional choice depends on the assumption that the basic insti-
tutional structure is similar—or at least comparable—across constitutions. 
Such a measure also depends on the comparability of what is included in 
constitutions—that is, IS. So, for example, it would be challenging to com-
pare the choice of electoral system for the legislature because not all constitu-
tions include a legislature and, of those that do, only a small minority of those 
specify the selection method in any detail (add to this the further issue of 
comparing unicameral to bicameral legislatures). By contrast, rights are uni-
versal in European and Latin American constitutions and represent a fairly 
discrete and structure-free set of binary choices along which to make com-
parisons of content. Each European constitution in our sample provides for at 
least some rights; the question is which ones. Between 1789 and 1946, draft-
ers in Europe saw fit to provide for 61 of the 73 rights that we include in the 
survey (after 1946, European drafters would go on to include the other 12).
We can aggregate these two sets of items into indices that allow us to sum-
marize the similarity of any two constitutions across each respective set. 
Consider first the inventory items. I calculate a measure of IS by summing 
the number of topics for which any two constitutions agree (i.e., that they 
both omit or include the topic) and dividing this sum by the number of topics 
in the set (70). Accordingly, two cases score a 0 if they do not match on a 
single topic and a 1 if they match on every topic. I calculate this measure of 
similarity for a sample of 186 of the 366 constitutions written before 1946 
and each of their peers. The result is an asymmetric matrix with some 17,000 
unique constitutional dyads (one score for each of the 186 constitutions and 
each of its pairs). The scores across these dyads have a mean of .65 (SD = .10) 
and range from .27 to .98. Not surprisingly, the most similar pairs typically 
 at UNIV OF TEXAS AUSTIN on September 13, 2010cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
986  Comparative Political Studies 43(8/9)
involve constitutions from the same country. This is especially true with 
some of the more prolific constitution producers from Latin America, such as 
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, some of whose pairs of constitutions 
exhibit similarity scores as high as .98. Within Europe, some of this serial 
similarity is evident (Spain’s 1837 and 1845 constitutions have a score of 
.93). The highest similarity within Europe for cross-country dyads is .85 for 
the dyad of Spain (1812) and Portugal (1822), and the lowest is .37 for that 
of Spain (1808) and Austria (1920). The calculation of the index of rights 
similarity is comparable. As it turns out, the patterns I describe here are 
largely similar across the two measures; I focus the discussion that follows 
on the inventory measure for simplicity.
The sample in question is fairly heterogeneous, and a multivariate analy-
sis of these dyads allows us to test some of the similarity hypotheses more 
precisely. Table 1 reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression 
on the IS measure for two models, with the similarity measure rescaled to 
range from 0 to 100, instead of 0 to 1. The first model includes a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if dyads include constitutions from the same region, 
and zero otherwise. We might think of this variable as the undifferentiated 
spatial lag that diffusion researchers often employ. That is, it tests for regional 
clustering, averaged over the various regions, and, thus, assumes the same 
amount of within-region similarity across regions. With respect to constitu-
tions written prior to 1946, the caseload is restricted to Western Europe and 
Latin America, although another 30% come from the remaining regions. The 
first model specification also includes two basic controls. Given the serial 
nature of constitution-making within countries as well as the distinct possi-
bility of generation effects, we control for dyads of constitutions from the 
same country and the absolute value of the difference in the years in which 
two constitutions were promulgated, respectively.
The results of that first model suggest that constitutions from the same 
country are more similar by 7.19 points, an effect almost eerily identical to 
that of dyads from the same region (b = 7.19). That is, constitutions from 
the same region are, on average, as similar to one another as are constitutions 
from the same country. The era variable has predictable effects, at least in 
their direction: Constitutions separated by 100 years are about 4 points less 
similar on average. The magnitude of this effect is interesting as region 
appears to be somewhat more influential than era. Countries that are sepa-
rated by 50 years differ by only 2 points or so, whereas those from the same 
region are a full 7 points more similar. Regardless, these effects make for 
useful benchmarks by which to understand the effects we discuss momen-
tarily. The omnibus same-region variable showed a strong effect, but it 
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could be, as we hypothesize, that these effects vary by region, thus yielding 
an attenuated aggregate effect. To dig more deeply, the second specification 
includes dummy variables for each of the Latin American and European 
dyads, respectively, as well as dummy variables for U.S.–Latin American 
dyads and U.S.–European dyads, thus facilitating tests of our basic expec-
tations. We find that Latin American dyads are considerably more similar 
than others (b = 7.28), an effect nearly equivalent to a move of a full stan-
dard deviation on the dependent variable. On the other hand, European 
dyads are actually less similar to one another than is the average dyad (b = 
–3.77) and, thus, clearly less similar to one another than are the Latin 
American dyads. Clearly, the European context in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries was less conducive to intraregional diffusion than was the Latin 
American one. If we turn to the second hypothesis, we note that the U.S. 
Constitution is, if anything, less similar to Latin American constitutions 
than is the average dyad (b = –1.00, not significantly different from 0). The 
U.S. Constitution is even less similar, on average, to European constitu-
tions (b = –4.94), as we predicted. Together, these findings suggest that 
some of our basic assumptions about the adoption of midlife constitutions 
in Europe may be valid.
Untangling Influences on European Constitutional Design
We have a general sense, then, that European constitutions exhibited more 
heterogeneity in their design than did their counterparts in Latin America and 
Table 1. Predicting Similarity in Constitutional Inventory (Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimates)
 Model 1 Model 2
Same country dyad 7.19 (0.42) 7.08 (0.40)
Difference in years/100 -3.81 (0.17) -3.85 (0.17)
Same region dyad 7.18 (0.14) 1.51 (0.50)
Latin American dyad   7.28 (0.51)
European dyad   -3.77 (0.59)
U.S.–Latin American dyad   -1.00 (0.84)
U.S.–European dyad   -4.94 (1.35)
Constant 67.25 (0.13) 67.30 (0.12)
R2 .19  .25 
Note: N = 17,020 constitutional dyads from 187 constitutions. Universe is constitutions pro-
mulgated prior to 1946. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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that the U.S. document was less influential in Europe and even less influen-
tial in Latin America than we had thought. It is one thing to show that Europe 
did not converge on a distinct constitutional form in the same way that Latin 
American states had. This finding is but the beginning of the story, for a 
regionwide measure of similarity across eras can obscure spatial and tempo-
ral clusters of shared design within the region. Indeed, the varied set of 
relationships among countries that, as we described, characterized Europe at 
the turn of the 19th century, to say nothing of subsequent years, may have 
produced more nuanced patterns of clustering. We explore such patterns in 
more depth here. In particular, we analyze the centrality of specific constitu-
tional models in 19th-century Europe. Consider, first, the constitutional 
models available to designers prior to 1820. By that year, 48 constitutions 
had been written (17 of which are in our sample). We can assess the centrality 
of these constitutions by calculating their mean similarity to constitutions 
that would appear up through 1945. In terms of their similarity in inventory 
to future documents, the most important of these early constitutions were 
those of France (1791), Spain (1812, the “Cadíz” constitution), and the docu-
ments of the German states of Bavaria (both that of 1808 and that of 1812) and 
Baden (1818). All of these constitutions exhibit mean similarity scores with 
future European documents that are at least one standard deviation above the 
sample mean. That is, they are clearly central and, presumably, at least some 
of them served as important sources of inspiration. By contrast, the U.S. Con-
stitution as well as that of Sweden (1809) and the French constitutions of 
1793, 1795, and 1799 appear fairly peripheral to those that would come later 
in Europe. If we expand the sample of constitutions to those that were avail-
able to drafters during the critical revolutions of 1848, we note another central 
document—the Belgian constitution of 1831. Together with the French con-
stitution of 1791 and the Spanish document of 1812, the Belgian constitution 
of 1831 is among the most central constitutions produced prior to 1848.
The centrality of these three constitutions makes sense because they are 
sometimes regarded by historians as landmark documents, if not models for 
future drafters (e.g., Blaustein & Sigler, 1988). The French constitution of 
1791, of course, represents the first modern constitution on European soil 
along with the still-born Polish constitution of the same year.5 Given its path-
breaking quality, we might not be surprised at its centrality. On the other hand, 
the constitution lasted only a short time, to be replaced by successive constitu-
tions in 1793, 1795, 1799, and so on—thus sowing the seeds for ridicule in 
Anglo quarters about Franco hyper-constitutionalism and even friendly fire 
from within France about whether Gallic territory should be characterized as 
a garden or graveyard for constitutions.6 Indeed, the data confirm that the 
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1795 and 1799 documents represent significant departures from the 1791 
model. The drafters of the French constitution of 1848 (that of the second 
republic) drew heavily from the 1791 document, as did other European draft-
ers. In fact, of all the constitutions in Europe written after 1791, the closest and 
furthest documents to the French constitution of 1848 are both from France: the 
1791 document (IS = .81) and the 1799 document (IS = .50), respectively. 
Rarely do we witness such wild swings in content within the same country.
The celebrated Cadíz constitution (Spain 1812) appears to have had a fair 
amount of original content. Indeed, of the early constitutions, it has the least 
amount of content in common with prior constitutions. The French constitution 
of 1791 appears to have been its closest model, but their similarity is only 
slightly greater than the average for any two constitutions in the sample. We 
can thus think of it as having drawn from the French document while introduc-
ing a significant amount of original material. In turn, the Cadíz constitution 
appears to have been a model for others in Europe, thus spreading the French 
ideas as well as its own. Thus, in some ways the Cadíz constitution was 
uniquely positioned to influence the direction of other states emerging from a 
Napoleonic order or otherwise shifting toward a republican form of gover-
nance. The Cadíz constitution had its most direct impact on the Portuguese 
constitution of 1822. The two constitutions are among the most similar of any 
of the European pairs written prior to 1946 (IS = .85). Only a glance at the two 
documents is enough to reveal the striking similarity, but more on that shortly.
The Belgian constitution of 1831—a famously influential document—
appears to have been directly influenced by the Cadíz constitution (IS = .79). 
In turn, the Belgian constitution was clearly the model for the ten constitu-
tions of 1848. Of the 1848 revolutionary documents, the Belgian document 
and the Bavarian text of 1818 appear to have been the most central, if not 
influential. In particular, the Italian document of 1848 bears a striking simi-
larity to the Belgian model (IS = .77).
And what of the United States in Europe? Was the product of the U.S. 
founders as peripheral as the average effects would lead us to believe? We 
know that various European constitutional assemblies had copies at hand of 
the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Independence, the state 
constitutions, and even the Federalist Papers (Billias, 1990). Strangely, the 
only European constitution whose similarity to the U.S. document is more 
than one standard deviation above the sample average is Norway 1814 (IS = 
.73), although the U.S. resemblance to others (e.g., France 1791 and Austria 
1919) is clearly above average. It appears likely that some of the U.S. impact 
on constitutional design, a modest as it was, may have operated indirectly 
through the document’s impact on the French text of 1791.
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Episodes of Democratic Reform: 
Spain and Portugal
We now turn our attention to the Iberian peninsula in the early nineteenth 
century. The macro evidence above seems to more than corroborate the often-
cited supposition that the Spanish constitution of 1812 strongly influenced 
constitutional drafters elsewhere, among them, drafters in Portugal in 1822.7 
For various reasons, it makes sense to look more closely at the process of 
institutional design in these two episodes. Most importantly, as I describe 
below, the cases were similar in many ways except for one—a factor that, but 
for diffusion, should have resulted in two very different constitutional texts. 
For us, then, two counterfactual queries are relevant: (a) How might the Por-
tuguese constitution of 1822 have been different had its drafters not consulted 
the Spanish document? and relatedly (b) How might the course of democratic 
reform in Portugal in subsequent generations been different if the Portuguese 
had adopted a more indigenous document? These are, undoubtedly, probing 
questions and I do not propose to offer the definitive historiography of Iberian 
liberalism in the space of several pages. On the other hand, taking a hard run 
at these important questions helps to illustrate the democratic stakes for con-
stitutional drafters and, in turn, the consequences of constitutional diffusion.
In many ways, the historical context leading to the drafting of the Spanish 
and Portuguese charters was quite similar. After the French revolution, both 
monarchies tried to temper similar liberal movements at home, notably by 
sealing off communication with France. Later, as France entered its imperial 
phase, neither was able to resist Napoleon’s grande armée successfully 
enough, and by 1808 Napoleon’s brother Joseph sat on the throne in Spain. 
In both countries, the monarchy had fled. Spain’s Carlos IV had left for 
France, where he would be joined by his son Fernando VII, who would 
become the vessel in which Spanish monarchists poured their executive 
hopes (he would be known as el deseado, the “desired,” during this time). 
Meanwhile, in Portugal Dom João had left for Rio de Janeiro, thus transfer-
ring the seat of the erstwhile Portuguese empire to Brazil (interestingly, 
Spain’s Carlos had resisted suggestions by his advisors to make the same 
move to the country’s American outposts). In Spain, Bonaparte had managed 
to impose the “first” Spanish constitution in 1808. However, the first autoch-
thonous constitutional effort in Spain occurred in 1812, while still under 
siege by the French; the Portuguese moment came 10 years later in 1822. 
Both Iberian countries would have similar constitutional concerns that were, 
incidentally, not too different from those of revolutionary France: how to 
manage the church, which still held inquisitions in each country to the 
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dismay of liberals; how to accommodate their anxious colonial residents; and 
whether or not to discontinue a system of seigniorage. Not to mention, of 
course, the issue of what role the monarchy would play.
The setting and membership of the constitutional drafting assemblies in 
Spain and Portugal were strikingly different. During the French occupation 
(or, rather, the peninsular war as it became known in England), Spanish local 
authorities carried out a decentralized guerrilla war, whereas the national 
authorities maintained a shadow government of sorts. By 1810, that junta had 
managed to assemble a version of the Cortes (the name for the representative 
assembly in both Spain and Portugal) in Cadíz, a unique city and port in south-
western Spain. As a refuge from Bonaparte, Cadíz was ideal—the city sits on 
a narrow strip of land just off the coast and, as home to what was left of the 
Spanish navy, was easily defended. Culturally, Cadíz was exceptional as well. 
After sand bars rendered the Guadalquivir River impassable in the 1700s and 
thus any real shipping in and out of Sevilla, almost all of the Americas trade 
went through Cadíz, giving the city a decidedly cosmopolitan and mercantile 
feel. As one of the most liberal cities in Spain, Cadíz made for a rather unrep-
resentative host to a constitutional convention in 1812.8 Moreover, the mem-
bers of the Cortes who assembled in Cadíz were themselves atypical. Although 
the members of the Cortes were to be elected (indirectly) throughout war-torn 
Spain, elections were suspended in areas held tightly by the French, which not 
coincidentally, were the most conservative areas. These seats were filled with 
substitute members selected from the ranks of liberal authorities in Cadíz by 
the already disproportionately liberal Cortes. All this amounted to a highly 
unrepresentative Cortes, tailor made to produce an atypically liberal docu-
ment. As Stanley Payne (1973) puts it, “Conservatives were outnumbered, 
outmaneuvered, and outtalked at Cádiz” (p. 427).
Compare this group with the Cortes that assembled in Lisbon in 1820. 
Lisbon was not quite the liberal haven that Cadíz had been, and the election 
of deputies appears to have resulted in a group that had, if anything, a conser-
vative bent. Piteira Santos’s (1962) narrative of the era suggests a group that 
grossly overrepresented rural elites and landholders.9 There is also, fortu-
nately, some scattered but reasonably comparable data on the profile of each 
of the Cortes, and it is possible to make some rough comparisons (Table 2). 
In terms of economic interests, the differences do not appear as stark as the 
various narratives suggest, but of course professional designations of the 
members may be misleading. The strong presence of government officials 
(presumably mostly local Cadíz authorities serving as substitutes) is quite 
noticeable in the Cadíz Cortes. But whatever liberal atmosphere pervaded at 
Cadíz, it is clear that the church was better represented there (where they 
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were one third of the membership) than they were in Lisbon (where they 
accounted for one sixth). Moreover, the clergy appears to have been even 
better represented in the all-important drafting committee in Cadíz, with 6 of 
13 spots (Suarez, 1976, p. 21). At the risk of overdrawing differences, what 
emerges, then, is a picture of two strikingly different settings with two decid-
edly different casts and, presumably, two different predispositions toward 
constitutional design.
Nevertheless, the two assemblies produced very similar charters, with the 
Portuguese text notably drawn from the Spanish. There are obvious stylistic 
similarities: The charters have the structure, each with roughly 10 chapters on 
the same topics, within which they provide for a very similar governmental 
structure and a very similar set of relationships between the king and the 
Cortes. The one obvious stylistic difference is that the Portuguese charter of 
1822 leads with a section on rights, whereas the Spanish constitution inte-
grates these rights that are almost identical throughout the body of the text. 
The language itself is almost identical in most articles, given the similarity of 
the syntax and shared cognates between Portuguese and Spanish. Indeed, 
unless one were well acquainted with either document, it is likely that one 
could pass for the other. To take a small but discrete example, consider the 
Table 2. Membership in Drafting Assemblies, by Profession, Spanish Cortes (1810), 
Portuguese Cortes (1821)
 Spain Portugal
Group n % n %
Lawyers and judgesa 60 20 39 39
Intellectualsb 20 7 21 21
Clergy 97 32 16 16
Military 46 15 10 10
Physicians   6 6
Landowners 15 5 5 5
Merchants   3 3
Government employees 55 18  
Miscellaneous 10 3  
Total membership 303 100 100 100
Sources: Fernández Almagro (1928, p. 82), Farias (1975), and Piteira Santos (1962).
a. Labeled as “lawyers” by Fernández Almagro and as “magistrates and jurists” by Piteira San-
tos. I combine the groups.
b. Labeled as “intellectuals” by Fernández Almagro and as “teachers and liberal professionals” 
by Piteira Santos. I combine the two groups.
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provisions from Article 117 (Portugal 1822) and Article 159 (Spain 1812), 
both of which establish a permanent committee of the Cortes, composed of 
seven members, three from the overseas provinces (the Americas, mostly), 
three from the peninsula, and one to be chosen by lot between a peninsular and 
overseas deputy. True, both Spain and Portugal were at the time attempting to 
hold on to their colonial possessions in the Americas, but it seems likely that 
the two sets of drafters would have elected a different balance between penin-
sular and overseas representation in this important committee. Another strik-
ing example comes at the conclusion of the charters, both of which close with 
a self-contained chapter on education, including identical provisions for the 
establishment of primary schools and universities throughout the country to 
teach Catholic catechism and civic lessons as well as a provision for academic 
freedom. This sort of broad attention to education is not the typical material of 
constitutions—at least those created in Philadelphia or Paris.
None of this is not to say that the Portuguese drafters adopted the Spanish 
document uncritically, or without revision. For example, the Portuguese opted 
importantly for an elected Cortes, whereas the Spanish charter envisioned a 
rather tortured three-stage set of indirect elections. Also, the Spanish constitu-
tion required that members of the Cortes sit out a term before their reelection; 
the Portuguese constitution stated explicitly that Cortes members could be 
reelected. One also notices small, but symbolically important flourishes: The 
phrase “the person of the King is inviolable” leads the section on the king in 
the Cadíz constitution but is left to the end of the same section in the Portu-
guese charter. Remarkably, it is possible that some of these differences came 
at the encouragement of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham had been looking for an 
outlet for his political philosophy for some time and, at the age of 72, he 
appears to have seen the Portuguese constitutional process as his last best 
hope. He corresponded relentlessly with at least three members of the Cortes, 
to whom he also sent 20 of his works, some of which were introduced into the 
official record of the Cortes and ordered to be translated. In a “Letter to the 
Portuguese Nation” that he published in a London magazine, he recommended 
that the Portuguese adopt a version of the Spanish constitution with some 
explicit modifications, two of which were the implementation of direct elec-
tions and the removal of legislative term limits (Carvalho dos Santos, 1982; 
Fuller, 2000). The extent of his influence is unclear, but it does appear that the 
Portuguese delegates operated in concert with his advice (whether indepen-
dently or not). Bentham’s call for the end of Iberian colonialism—an essay 
playfully entitled “Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria!”—certainly did not register. 
So, apart from a few notable exceptions, it is clear that the Spanish charter had 
a strong influence on members of the Portuguese Cortes.
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Let us consider some of the more consequential decisions in Cadíz and, 
thereby, Lisbon. A significant issue in the Cadíz assembly had to do with the 
role of the church. The resulting document did away with courts of inquisi-
tion, which was clearly opposed by Cadíz liberals, but in other respects the 
representatives of the clergy were able to stamp the constitution with a clearly 
ecclesiastical identity, something decidedly foreign to the tradition of France 
1791. A chapter on Religion begins and ends with Article 12 that declares the 
“religion of the Spanish nation is, and shall be perpetually, Apostolic Roman 
Catholic, the only true religion. The nation protects it by wise and just laws 
and prohibits the exercise of any other whatsoever.” The charter spells out 
oaths of office that begin with the duty to protect the church, provisions to 
teach religious material in schools, and so on. Each of these provisions is car-
ried through identically in the Portuguese document. It is unclear whether 
and how the Portuguese would have provided for the church (e.g., regarding 
courts of inquisition, which existed in Portugal to that time as well) had they 
not followed the Spanish example in lockstep. The predisposition of Portu-
guese delegates was decidedly mixed: Compared to the Spanish Cortes, the 
Portuguese body was arguably more conservative, but yet the role of the 
clergy was decidedly a smaller one (at least numerically). So, one may have 
expected an arrangement closer to the French model. One thing that is clear 
is that because the Spanish provisions were imported wholesale, we can 
never know the Portuguese independent preference.
Perhaps the most consequential bit of inheritance from the Spanish document 
had to do with the amendment rules. The Spanish document insists on a 
remarkably firm commitment by restricting any amendments for a period of 
eight years after the charter has been put in force (after which amendments 
were approved by a two thirds vote by consecutive legislatures). The Portuguese 
constitution struck a slightly more flexible stance, insisting on a four-year 
waiting period and then passage by two thirds in consecutive assemblies. A 
handful of subsequent constitutions have similarly entrenched themselves 
with waiting periods, most following the example of the Spanish charter, and 
to a constitution they have met a rather disastrous fate. The Spanish and Por-
tuguese constitutions—as important as they were historically—would be no 
exceptions. Each would be replaced in a matter of years, to be reinstated later 
in various forms throughout the century, but replaced they were. Admittedly, 
these were tumultuous years in both countries, but amendment intransigence 
did not help the documents adapt. Stepping outside of Iberia, I should note a 
striking (perhaps the most striking) empirical regularity with respect to the 
lifespan of constitutional systems: Those documents that are overly costly to 
reform (read: hard to amend) exhibit a significantly higher risk of death 
(Elkins et al., 2009). In this sense, the Spanish constitution and its Portuguese 
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offspring are all too typical. The subsequent Portuguese constitution of 1826, 
which would be in place until 1910, opted for a much more flexible amend-
ment procedure (amendments are passed like ordinary legislation by succes-
sive legislatures). In 1885, legislators availed themselves of the flexible 
procedure to revise the amendment procedure itself and reverted to the 1822 
rule—a four-year waiting period between two amendment proposals. Not 
purely coincidentally, 25 years later these rules would be evaded and the 
constitution would be replaced entirely.
It is hard to say how the decisions taken in 1822 affected the development 
of politics in Portugal in subsequent years. It is clear that many of the 1822 
ideas took shape in the 1826 constitution and continued in its various itera-
tions up through the transition to a full republic in 1910. The making of the 
1826 constitution is itself an interesting story, which I leave to another time, 
but suffice it to say that it is an indirect descendant of the 1812 Spanish 
constitution via the Brazilian independence constitution of 1824, which 
descended from the Portuguese constitution of 1822. Even the republican 
structure of the 1910 document owed something to the original Portuguese 
constitution of 1822: For example, republican Portugal maintained a unicam-
eral legislature, the constitution included a similar slate of rights as did the 
1822 document, and so on. In short, the adoption of the Spanish model had a 
decided impact on the stability of the 1822 Portuguese text and, certainly, on 
the character of institutions for years to come.
Conclusion
This article argues in behalf of the strong assumption—perhaps controversial 
in some circles—that the content of national constitutions affects both the 
quality of democracy and the expected frequency of democratic reform. If 
one accepts this assumption, the implication is that theories of constitutional 
design should be central to the work of those interested in tracing the roots of 
democracy. In turn, any theory of constitutional design must begin with the 
overwhelming prima facie evidence of the diffusion—by some mechanism 
or another—of constitutional ideas from one context to another. So to under-
stand the shaping of national constitutions in a given country, one must take 
into account the constitutional experiences and models of those countries that 
inspire its drafters. However, scholars have so far lacked some basic empiri-
cal knowledge concerning the external influences on constitutional design in 
19th-century Europe. Which constitutions were most influential? How can 
we characterize the networks of influence across countries? We set out some 
basic hypotheses along these lines and then test them with an original set 
of data on the content of constitutions. Some interesting patterns emerge. 
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Among them, we note that the Western European story is decidedly not one 
of regional convergence. It is rather the opposite. The average pair of early 
European constitutions is less alike than is the average pair of constitutions, 
whether from the same region or not. When we dig more deeply into the pat-
tern of constitutional reform, a number of explanations emerge. Not only is it 
probably the case that distinct European national traditions and legacies led 
to regional diversity, but it is also the case that the lack of a single successful 
model in the early years of constitutionalization led to increased experimen-
tation and the development subregional clusters of constitutionalism. The 
constitutionalization of Western Europe is still very much a story of diffu-
sion. However, the region exhibits a more complicated set of inheritances 
with multiple blood lines. In some sense then, evidence of diffusion in 
Europe—a region where such processes were not expected to have a particu-
larly strong historical impact—makes the case for diffusion explanations 
more generally. In any event, it seems clear that suspicions of widespread 
contagion of constitutional form cannot be rejected, and even further inves-
tigation of these patterns seems warranted. These conclusions serve to 
disturb some of the rather settled notions of European democratization, 
which tend to emphasize variation in domestic class structure and other 
important factors inside of nation-states. At the very least, it seems reason-
able at this point to revisit, perhaps more skeptically, some of the oft-repeated 
story lines from the first wave of democratization.
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Notes
1. Nonconstitutionalist has come to refer to the idea of restraining political actors, 
which though certainly a central purpose of constitutions, is not one and the same 
as the label would suggest.
2. Regime change here is measured by a three-unit move one way or another on the 
Polity 0–20 scale, and change in regime and constitution is scored as coincident 
if they occur within 1 year of each other.
3. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 30, 1787 (in Cappon, 1959, p. 196).
4. Online at comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
5. The Polish document was never put into force.
6. I am thinking, for example, about the old yarn about the man who goes to the 
library in search of the French constitution only to be told that the library does not 
stock periodicals.
7. Jordi Solé Tura and Eliseo Aja (1977) cite the early-20th-century scholar Mirkine-
Guetzevich as crediting the Spanish constitution of 1812 with being even more 
influential than the U.S. Constitution and the French constitution of 1791.
8. As Payne (1973) describes Cadíz and its product,
The liberal Cortes and its resulting constitution could probably have taken the 
shape they did only in Cádiz, the most liberal city in the peninsula at that time. 
Open to foreign influence, living off the American trade, led mostly by a 
middle class that had made its money from commerce and not landed domin-
ion, the Cádiz environment gave a decisive thrust to constitutional reformism. 
(p. 425)
9. Payne (1973) describes them thusly,
The characteristic that the deputies had most in common was that the great major-
ity of them represented the rural and landholding upper middle class and were 
especially interested in advancing the position of that class. The most conserva-
tive deputies were those chosen from the Beira region, seat of the country’s only 
university (Coimbra). (pp. 517-518)
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